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WHY CALIFORNIA SHOPPING CENTERS
CAN'T PROTECT MICKEY MOUSE FROM
UNION HANDBILLING: A COMMENT ON
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES V. NLRB
I. INTRODUCTION
Hey Mouseketeers!
Before you shop in the Disney store, you should know what
Disney is doing with your money:
Disney heaps millions of taxpayer dollars on CEO Michael
Eisner ... while exploiting workers in the U.S. and abroad.'

In Glendale Associates v. NLRB (Glendale Associates J1),2 the
Ninth Circuit held that a shopping center could not prevent union
handbillers from distributing flyers containing a mall tenant's name
to mall patrons. 3 The shopping center had maintained a rule that
prohibited certain groups from identifying a mall manager, owner, or
tenant by name in handbills given to the mall's customers.4 The
court's decision is significant because it is the first time under
California law that a court has determined that such a rule was
unlawful. The court's reasoning was based in part on California
Supreme Court precedent and in part on First Amendment
jurisprudence.5
1. Glendale Assocs., Ltd., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 32 (2001) (emphasis added).
For ease of reference, this case will be referred to as "Glendale Associates 1'
while the later Ninth Circuit case, Glendale Associates v. NLRB, 347 F. 3d
1145 (9th Cir. 2003), will be referred to as "Glendale Associates IT"
2. 347 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. Id. at 1158.
4. Exempt from the rule, for example, were advertisements by mall
tenants. Id. at 1156.
5. Id. at 1153-58.
1799
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The shopping center at issue threatened union handbillers with
arrest for trespassing if they continued to handbill without removing
a reference to "the Disney Store" 6 from their flyer. The Ninth
Circuit noted that California courts had held that handbillers had a
free speech right under the California Constitution to conduct
expressive activity 7 on a shopping center's private property.8 The
Ninth Circuit further noted that the right to conduct expressive
activity was not absolute, and could be subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner limitations imposed by the shopping center. 9
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the shopping center's rule through
the lens of First Amendment jurisprudence. 10 Courts look to First
Amendment jurisprudence to interpret the free speech provisions of
the California Constitution when there is no California precedent on
point."' Before Glendale Associates H1, no California court had
examined
whether such a rule was a lawful time, place, and manner
12
rule.
The Ninth Circuit began by applying the same tests that are
applicable to government entities under the First Amendment.' 3 The
court asked whether the restriction was a content-based or a contentneutral reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.' 4 A contentbased restriction is impermissible unless it passes a strict test, while
courts grant a content-neutral restriction greater deference.' 5 The
court concluded that the rule was a content-based restriction. 16 The
court found that the shopping center's rule did not meet the strict
requirements to qualify as a lawful content-based restriction,
and
17
thus, the threat of arrest had violated the handbillers' rights.
6. Id. at 1149-50.
7. Expressive activity refers to the circulation of petitions and handbills
that are not directly related to commercial purposes. See, e.g., Robins v.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902, 592 P.2d 341, 342, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 855 (1979).
8. GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1154-55.
9. Id. at 1154.
10. Id. at 1149.
11. Id. at 1156-58.
12. Id. at 1156.
13. Id. at 1157.
14. Id. at 1155-57.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1158.
17. Id.
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This Comment will summarize the facts of Glendale Associates
II and the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. It will then present four lines of
analysis regarding the case. First, it will argue that the Ninth Circuit
appropriately used the First Amendment test applicable to
government entities within the shopping center context. Second, it
will propose that the court should have relied on a prior California
Supreme Court decision, In re Lane 18 to confirm its First
Amendment analysis. Third, it will examine the concerns the Ninth
Circuit may have had over the validity of that case as current
precedent, and will conclude that the California Supreme Court's
holding in Lane is still valid and bolsters the holding in Glendale
Associates 1I. Finally, it will consider the implications of the Ninth
Circuit's holding.
II. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES II

A. Background Facts
In June 1997, NABET-CWA Local 57 ("Local 57")19 was one
of five NABET-CWA labor union locals 20 involved in bargaining a
Master Agreement with ABC, Inc.2 1 The parties were negotiating a
successor to the Master Agreement that had expired on March 31,
1997.22 ABC, Inc. had proposed changes that would eliminate the

18. 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
19. NABET-CWA Local 57 is the abbreviation for the National

Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, the Broadcast and Cable
Workers Sector of the Communication Workers of America, Local 57. The
author of this Comment was President of Local 57 from July 1994 to January
2004.
20. NABET-CWA Local 57 is a labor union local that represents television
and radio engineers, newswriters, producers and plant services employees who

work at the Los Angeles, California studios of ABC, Inc. The other four locals
represent similar employees who either work in, or were assigned out of, the
cities of New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. See, e.g.,
NABET-CWA Local 57, Who We Are, at http://www.nabet57.com/latest/
whoweare.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
21. ABC, Inc is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company,
Inc. See, e.g., NABET-CWA/ABC Master Agreement 1997-2003, Sideletter
EM (on file with the author).
22. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1148.
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employer's contribution to the employees' pension plan and reduce
the number ofjobs covered by the collective bargaining agreement.23
The employees represented by Local 57 continued to work after
expiration of their Master Agreement while the parties negotiated a
new collective bargaining agreement.24 To increase public pressure
on the employer's parent, Disney, the employees embarked on a
public education campaign at Disney Stores. 25 The campaign relied
26
on volunteer union members to educate the public by handbilling.
Local 57 hoped that through lawful persuasion, consumers would be
turned away in solidarity with the union employees and show support
27
by signing a postcard addressed to the CEO of Disney.
Local 57's leadership determined that the best location for
reaching the public would be in front of Disney Stores. The front
entrance is generally an effective location from which to persuade
the public because patrons are contemplating purchases as they are
about to enter the store. One of the challenges the union faced in
employing this strategy was that, in the greater Los Angeles area,
most Disney Stores lease commercial retail space in large enclosed
shopping malls or outdoor plazas.
The interior and exterior
walkways and parking lots that the public use to access the retailers
are privately and separately owned, rather than being public
property.
Initially, Local 57 members handbilled at the Glendale Galleria
in front of the Disney store without permission of the mall's
management.28 While handbilling, they were approached by mall
management, told that the mall maintained rules regulating
handbilling on its premises, and offered an application and a set of
rules.29 Under California law, shopping center owners must give
access to the public to conduct expressive activity, but are allowed to
adopt time, place, and manner regulations.3 ° Such rules are upheld
as reasonable as long as they are narrowly drawn and promote

23. Copies of proposals are on file with the author.
24. See GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1148-49.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
A copy of the postcard is on file with the author.
The Glendale Galleria is located in Glendale, California.

29. Glendale Assocs., 355 N.L.R.B. 27, 27 (2001).

30. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911 (1979).
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"specifically identified substantial interests." 31 In light of prior
California appellate court opinions, 3 2 Local 57 decided to take a
conservative approach and completed the application instead of
challenging the application process since the union's goal was
immediate: to get its members' message to mall patrons without the
delays that a court battle over "reasonableness" might entail.
Local 57's officers completed the application to handbill
near the Disney Store, and the Glendale Galleria granted them
permission.33 The handbilling was scheduled for June 7, 1997.34 In
spite of that permission, mall management threatened to arrest Local
57 President Gena Stinnett 35 and Local 57 member Neal Noorlag if
they handbilled. 36 Their crime-the union's flyer named the Disney
Store, a mall tenant.37 One of the Galleria's rules prohibited certain
groups from naming a Galleria manager, owner or tenant on
handbills given to Galleria customers. 38 While employee disputes
with a primary employer were exempt from the rule, the mall did not

31. H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d
1193, 1209, 238 Cal. Rptr. 841, 851 (1987). Already recognized substantial
interests include "freedom from disruption of normal business operations and
freedom from interference with customer convenience." Id. at 1208. This test
is derived from the test applicable to government entities. See Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining that time, place, and
manner rules, as imposed by the government, are acceptable "provided the
restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information"' (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
32. See, e.g., Union of Needletrades v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 4th
996, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (1997) (holding that reasonable time, place, and
manner rules may be enforced against union activity at shopping malls).
33. Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003).
34. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B at 27.
35. Id. Ms. Stinnett is the author of this Comment. It is an adage in
Hollywood that "it doesn't matter what they say about you, as long as they
spell your name right." Due to a typographical error, "Stinnett" is spelled
"Stinett" in the administrative law judge's decision. See id. at 30.
36. While they were threatened with arrest by mall management, no police
officer ever arrived to carry out the threat. An arrest does not have to be made
for the threat to be actionable. See id.
37. Id.
38. GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1149.
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apply the exemption in this case, as the handbillers were not
employees of the Disney Store.39
Additionally, Glendale Galleria rules required that all
handbillers be identified on the application form. 40 Local 57
provided under protest the names of the handbillers.4 ' Union
leadership believed it was conceivable that the mall would turn the
list over to the Disney Store, which in turn could provide it to ABC,
Inc., the primary employer. 42 The union was concerned that the
employees would be targeted by the employer as pro-union, and thus
vulnerable to discrimination by the employer.43 Local 57 filed a
Labor Board charge against the Glendale Galleria owners and
management over the threat of arrest and the requirement that
handbillers be identified. 44
Even though the parties had a dispute over the content of the
handbill, the Glendale Galleria continued to allow Local 57 to

39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 1150.
42. While it is true the handbillers were in a public place and could be
observed by anyone in the mall, including ABC, Inc. management, the
handbillers would also be able to see members of management who just
"happened" to be at the mall observing them. If the mall "secretly" transmitted
the list to ABC, Inc. management, and ABC, Inc. management unlawfully
discriminated against the handbillers because of their union activity, the union
would lack evidence that managers knew that the employees were union
activists, a necessary element in proving discrimination. Further, managers of
the primary employer could come to the mall only if they had a legitimate
reason for doing so. Otherwise, they would be subject to an NLRB charge for
surveillance of union activity. See, e.g., Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 N.L.R.B.
1186 (1984) (finding that the employer's overt and intended surveillance of
union handbillers on public property was a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")).
43. For example, the employer could reassign to less desirable jobs
employees who had demonstrated pro-union sympathies.
44. Glendale Assocs., N.L.R.B. Case No. 31-CA-22759 (June 1997)
(charge against employer) (am. Sept. 1997). To avoid needless repetition,
when this Comment refers to the Glendale Galleria, that reference is inclusive
of the owners and management who qualified as employers under the NLRA.
Glendale Orbach's Associates, one of the co-owners, was not an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of section 2 of the NLRA, and was
not subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 33
(2001).
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handbill on subsequent occasions. 45 During the five months that
Local 57 sporadically handbilled at the Glendale Galleria, additional
problems arose.
Galleria security interfered with Local 57's
handbillers by telling them "that they had to refrain from initiating
any communication with the Galleria patrons," by requiring them to
remove backpacks while handbilling, and by telling them that their
signs had to be "professionally prepared." 46 Local 57 filed a second
Labor Board charge over this interference with their members'
protected union activity.47
B. ProceduralHistory
The Labor Board issued a complaint against the owners and
management of the Glendale Galleria, combining the two charges
into one complaint.4a As a result of settlement negotiations, the
Glendale Galleria agreed to post a "NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES"
that resolved some of the issues raised by the two Labor Board
charges.49 The Notice stated that the owners and management of
Glendale Galleria promised not to "interfere with employees' right to
handbill by telling them that they have to refrain from initiating any
communication with our patrons... [,] by telling them to remove
backpacks because such backpacks violate our dress code...
[, and]
50
prepared.
professionally
be
must
signs
that
them
by telling
45. The handbill was ultimately changed by NABET-CWA to reference
only "Disney," as it was also being used at other Disney-sponsored events.
46. Glendale Assocs., Order Consolidating Cases, N.L.R.B. No. 31-CA22759 (June 1998) (consol. am. compl. & notice of hr'g).
47. Glendale Assocs., N.L.R.B. Case No. 31-CA-23189 (Jan. 1998) (charge
against employer).
48. Glendale Assocs., Order Consolidating Cases, NL.R.B. No. 31-CA-

22759 (June 1998) (consol. am. compl. & notice of hr'g).

49. Glendale Assocs., N.L.R.B. Case No. 31-CA-23189 (Nov. 1998)
(settlement agreement). Settlement agreements do not set precedent. The

agreement is offered here to demonstrate how the process works and to provide
a complete background of the case.

50. Id.
As explained, supra note 31, reasonable time, place, and manner rules
must be narrowly drawn. For example, it is highly probable that Glendale
Galleria's restriction forbidding the initiation of communication with mall
patrons would have been found unlawful had the matter gone to hearing.

Courts have recognized that shopping centers do have a significant interest in
promoting the smooth flow of customers through its walkways. See H-CHH
Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1218
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The Glendale Galleria would not settle the original issues: (1)
the rule forbidding the naming of a mall tenant in a handbill, and (2)
the requirement that all handbillers be identified and listed on the
mall's application form. 51 Those issues were adjudicated before an
administrative law judge, 52 who found that the Glendale Galleria
violated the handbillers rights because the rule forbidding the naming
of a mall tenant was a content-based restriction, unlawful under both
the First Amendment and section 7 of the N.L.R.A.53 The judge
recommended that the mall be ordered to expunge its rule prohibiting
handbills "which identify by name the center owner, manager or any
tenant of the center." 54 However, the judge did not agree that the
mall rule requiring advance identification of handbillers was
unlawful.55 He recommended dismissing that challenge.56 The
Labor Board
adopted
the
administrative
law judge's
recommendations, with some modifications, in Glendale Associates
(1987). However, handbillers can approach customers as long as they do not
"impede or interfere" with the mall's customers. Id. at 1221. A rule that
prohibits "approaching" mall patrons has been struck down as "overbroad,
encompassing lawful, as well as unlawful, activity." Id.
51. See Motion of Counsel for the General Counsel to the Administrative
Law Judge Requesting Withdrawal of Complaint, N.L.R.B. Case No. 31-CA23189 (Feb. 18, 1999).
52. The case was heard and decided by Administrative Law Judge Michael
D. Stevenson, whose ruling was adopted in a modified form by the Labor
Board. Alice Garfield, General Counsel with the Labor Board, Region 31,
prosecuted the case on the union's behalf.
53. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 36 (2001).
54. Id.
55. The Labor Board found that the rule promoted significant interests of
the mall: (1) it reduced the risk of damage to the mall or injury to mall patrons,
and (2) gave the mall information to assess the necessity of requiring a group
to provide liability insurance. Id. at 35. These interests satisfied the second
prong of the two-part test that evaluates the reasonableness of the rule. See
discussion supra note 31. However, the Labor Board did not address the first
prong of the test, whether the rule was "narrowly tailored." The union's
position was that the rule was not narrowly tailored because it did not require
that the center maintain the list in confidence. In spite of that deficiency, the
Labor Board concluded that the rule was reasonable and that the Glendale
Galleria was entitled to maintain the rule under state law. But see Union of
Needletrades v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 4th 996, 1018-20, (1997)
(upholding a shopping center rule requiring the advance identification of union
participants after the shopping center had agreed to treat the list as
confidential).
56. See Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. at 36-37.
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(Glendale Associates 1).5 7 The Glendale Galleria appealed to the
Ninth Circuit the Labor Board's finding that it had violated the
handbillers rights. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Labor Board's
ruling.58
III. THE LABOR BOARD AND NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN
GLENDALE ASSOCIATES

The Labor Board and Ninth Circuit both concluded that the
Glendale Galleria's restriction against naming mall tenants in
handbills was unlawful. 59 After determining as a threshold matter
that state property law controlled the question of whether Local 57's
handbillers had a right of access to the shopping center property, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the Labor Board that the Glendale Galleria
was required to allow union activists access to conduct expressive
activity. 60 While the Glendale Galleria could maintain reasonable
time, place, and manner rules, those rules could not forbid expressive
activity such as handbilling even if the Glendale Galleria believed
the message could potentially hurt a mall tenant's business.6 ' Such 62a
rule would discriminate on the basis of content and be unlawful.
The Ninth Circuit affirmned the Labor Board's ruling, holding that
Glendale Galleria's rule forbidding the naming of a mall tenant was
an unlawful content-based restriction and the threat of arrest violated
the handbiller's rights.63

57. The Labor Board revised some details of the administrative law judge's

recommended order and did not adopt his entire analysis. Id. at 27. However,
those differences are not significant for the purposes of this Comment.
58. Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003). Local
57 did not appeal the ruling dismissing their challenge to the prior
identification of handbillers requirement, and that matter was not placed before
the Ninth Circuit.
59. The analysis of the Labor Board and the Ninth Circuit are presented
together to prevent repetition and enhance clarity. For the most part, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Labor Board but provided a greater depth of analysis.
60. GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d. at 1153, 1158.
61. Id. at 1154.
62. Id. at 1158.
63. Id.
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A. State PropertyLaw ControlsAccess for Protected Union
Handbilling

As a starting point, both the Labor Board and the Ninth Circuit
noted that it is unlawful for an employer to exclude from its premises
employees 64 engaged in union activity protected under section 7 of
the NLRA unless the employer possesses a state property right to
exclude the union handbillers. 65 Section 7 provides in part that:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection... ." Employee appeals to third parties
asking for their support in an ongoing collective bargaining dispute
between the employee and the primary employer-similar 67
to the
protection.
7
section
afforded
been
activity at issue here-have
The Glendale Galleria argued that under Lechmere, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board,6 8 the United States Supreme Court

had recognized that the rights granted employees under the NLRA do
not stop the employer from excluding union representatives from its
property under certain circumstances. 69
In Lechmere, union
organizers entered Lechmere's employee-used parking lot to
distribute informational union literature to Lechmere's employees as
part of an organizing campaign. 70 Lechmere personnel barred them
from the premises, claiming that the Lechmere Shopping Plaza had a
64. The employee does not have to be an employee of the mall. An
employer can violate the NLRA rights of someone who is not an employee of
the employer. If the employer qualifies under the NLRA as a "statutory
employer," the employer may be found to have committed an unfair labor
practice against employees other than its own. See Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B.
1257, 1258-59 (1952). The owners and managers of the Glendale Galleria,
except for Glendale Orbach's Associates, were statutory employers. Glendale
Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 33 (2001).
65. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1151-53; Glendale Assocs., 335
N.L.R.B. at 28 . The phrase "protected activity" refers to those employee
rights described in section 7 of the NLRA.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
67. See Sierra Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216-19 (9th Cir.
1989); see also, Kitty Clover, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 1665, 1687-88 (1953).
68. 502 U.S. 527 (1991).
69. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1151.
70. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 529.
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policy that banned distribution of literature by non-employees. 7' The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere for
barring them from the premises, claiming that other channels of
access were not reasonably available. 72 Prior NLRB opinions
allowed union organizers access to private property under a
balancing test that considered the availability of reasonably effective
alternative means of exercising the section 7 rights at issue.7 3
The United States Supreme Court held that nonemployee union
organizers must show that other access to employees is "infeasible"
before any balancing of the section 7 right and the property owner's
interest takes place.74 The Court found no violation of section 7
existed based on the exclusion of union representatives, noting that
the union had other available channels of communication, such as
holding pro-union signs outside the employee parking lot. 75 The
Court upheld the right of the shopping plaza to exclude the
nonemployee union organizers from its premises.76 However, the
Court did not articulate the basis for its decision that the employer
had the right to bar nonemployee union organizers.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in
Lechmere.77 The employer's right to post its property against trespass
by nonemployee union organizers was not a right granted by the
NLRA, but rather was a right derived from the property law of the
state where the "trespass" took place.78 However, "while this right is
not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly
protects it."' 79 In Lechmere, that right was provided by Connecticut
80
law, which protected the shopping center's right to exclude others.
Both the Labor Board and the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Lechmere was inapplicable to the Glendale Galleria facts, as
71. See id. at 530.
72. See id. at 531.

73. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
74. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538.

75. See id. at 540.
76. See id. at 541.
77. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
78. See Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1152 (reaffirming the
Ninth Circuit's analysis in NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999)
holding that Lechmere was inapplicable in a similar case, based on Thunder
Basin).
79. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 217 n.21 (emphasis added).
80. See Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1088.
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California law did not give the shopping center a right to exclude the
handbillers.8 1
Both tribunals applied a two-prong analytical
approach developed by the Ninth Circuit.8 2 Under that approach, the
Ninth Circuit asks first whether the individual handbiller engaged in
activities protected by section 7, and second, whether the person or
entity attempting to exclude the handbillers has "a property interest
under California law entitling it to exclude that activity.' '8 3 These are
distinct inquiries that look to section 7 of the NLRA to answer the
84
first question, and state property law to answer the second question.
If state law provides no right to exclude, then Lechmere does not
give the shopping center the right to exclude the handbillers.
Instead, if section 7 protects the 85
activity, the exclusion of the
practice.
labor
unfair
an
is
employees
B. ConsumerBoycott HandbillingIs Protectedby
Section 7 ofNLRA
The Ninth Circuit and the Labor Board spent little ink deciding
that the handbilling at issue was protected union activity under
section 7.86 Local 57 handbillers distributed a flyer that raised
collective bargaining terms at issue between NABET-CWA and
ABC, Inc. (e.g., pension contributions), advocated for better working
conditions on behalf of other employees who made Disney products,
and for the closure of a tax loophole benefiting Disney. 7 Thus, the
handbill dealt in part with the primary dispute the employees had
with ABC, Inc., but also urged8 8a boycott and other actions targeted at
the sister and parent company.
The Labor Board determined that the Local 57 handbillers had
stayed within the parameters of section 7:89 "Whether the handbill is
81. See GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1150, 1151-53.
82. See id. at 1153; Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 34-36 (2001); see
also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563 (1978); Calkins, 187 F.3d at
1088.
83. Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1088.
84. See id. at 1089.
85. See id.; see also O'Neil's Mkts, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 646 (1995); Bristol
Farms, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 437 (1993).
86. See GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1148.
87. For the complete text of the handbill, see id. at 1149 n.2.
88. Id.
89. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 27 n.5 (2001). The NABET-CWA
members did not work for the Disney Store, which was one of the entities
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considered a form of consumer information handbilling as to the
Union's dispute with ABC, Inc., consumer boycott handbilling, or
even a 'less-favored' form of secondary handbilling, it is clearly
protected under Sec. 7 of the Act." 90 The Ninth Circuit articulated it
slightly differently stating: "Section 7 protects Union members and
representatives that engage in activities to pressure their employer
during a labor dispute, even when picketing a sister company owned
by the same parent company." 91 Having found that the activity was
protected under section 7, both tribunals then looked to California
state property law to determine whether 92
the Glendale Galleria had a
handbillers.
57
Local
the
right to exclude
C. CaliforniaState PropertyLaw CannotBe Used to Exclude
Expressive Activity Handbillersfrom Shopping Center Property
To determine whether the shopping center had a California state
property right to exclude the union handbillers, both the Labor Board
and the Ninth Circuit looked to established case law.9 3 The
California Supreme Court had ruled in Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center94 that "section 295 and 396 of article I of the
California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably
targeted in the handbill. Rather, they worked for ABC, Inc. (the primary
employer), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Disney Enterprises. The
Disney Store, Inc. is also a wholly owned subsidiary of Disney Enterprises,
Inc., making them "sister" companies. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1148.
90. Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. at 27 n.5 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568
(1988); Oakland Mall, 316 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1163 n.14 (1995), enforced, 74

F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
91. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1153 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); NLRB v. Calkins,
187 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1999)).
92. See GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1153.

93. See supra Part III.A.
94. 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979).
95. Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution reads: "Every person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty
of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
96. Article I, section 3 of the California Constitution reads: "The people
have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for redress
of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 3.
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exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately
owned., 97 In Pruneyard, the California Supreme Court dealt with
political petitioning on the private property of a large shopping
center.9 8 There, the court found that the California Constitution
provided a broader free speech right than under the United States
Constitution, trumping a shopping center's right to invoke trespass
laws to exclude handbillers engaged in expressive activity. 99 The
court upheld the right of political petitioning on private property, but
00
made it subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
D. Rules RegulatingHandbill Content Violate Free Speech
Guaranteesof the CaliforniaConstitution
1. Content-Based Rules Are Impermissible
a. Labor Board analysis of the content-based restriction
The Labor Board determined that the Glendale Galleria rule
prohibiting handbills that named a tenant of the mall was a contentbased restriction and unlawful under California law.' 0 1 However, the
Board did so without much analysis. The Board observed that "[a]s
a practical matter, it appears that the purpose and effect of the rule,
as applied here, was simply to shield the [Glendale Galleria's]
tenants, such as the Disney Store, from being the subject of
otherwise lawful handbilling." 10 2 The administrative law judge was
equally terse in his analysis: "If found valid, said rule could render
any handbilling meaningless," as recipients may not realize the
10 3
connection between ABC, Inc., Disney, and the Disney Stores.
While both the Labor Board and the administrative law judge
recognized the heart of the issue, the Ninth Circuit provided a deeper
analysis of the problem. 1°4

97. Pruneyard,23 Cal. 3d at 910.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 902.
Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 910-11.
Glendale Assocs., 335 N.L.R.B. 27, 28 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 36.
104. See Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).
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b. Ninth Circuitanalysis of the content-based restriction
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in analyzing a state law
question, they are "bound by the decisions of the state's highest
court."' 10 5 If that court has not "squarely addressed an issue," the
Ninth Circuit must "'predict how the highest state court would
decide the issue,"' by analyzing how California appellate courts have
dealt with the issue, and by examining "'decisions from other
0 6
jurisdictions, statutes, treaties and restatements for guidance."1
To determine whether a time, place, and manner rule adopted by
a governmental entity is valid under California's constitution, the
California Supreme Court has held that the analysis will vary with
whether the rule is content-based or content-neutral. 10 7 California
courts heavily borrow from Federal First Amendment jurisprudence
in making the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
rules.10 8 Strict scrutiny is applied to content-based rules. 10 9 To pass
the strict scrutiny test, the rule must employ the least restrictive
110
means to further a compelling interest.
The Ninth Circuit applied the government entity standard and
concluded that the Glendale Galleria's rule was content-based, as it
was concerned with the literal content of the flyer, prohibiting speech
that ran counter to its interests, or the interests of its tenants.' 1 This
was evident because the Galleria had to review the flyer, and would
allow the naming of a mall tenant if it was contained in a tenant's
commercial literature or literature distributed by employees who had
a primary labor dispute with a Galleria tenant." 2 Furthermore, the
105. Id. at 1154 (citing NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.
1999)).
106. Id. at 1154 (quoting Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1089).
107. Id. at 1155 (citing L. A. Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles,

22 Cal. 4th 352, 364-65, 992 P.2d 334, 340-41, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 7-9
(2000)). The Glendale Galleria is a very large indoor shopping mall, and the
mall did not claim exemption from Pruneyard. See id. at 1148.

108. See id. at 1155 (citing Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d

1562, 273 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1991)). The court in Savage v. Trammell Crow Co.
found shopping center rules that narrowly limit speech to "political
expression" and ban religious speech violate the state constitutional principles
enunciated in Pruneyard. Savage, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1581.
109. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1155.
110. ld.

111. Id. at 1156.
112. Id.
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Local 57 handbillers did not qualify under the mall's "primarylabor
13
dispute" test since they were not employees of the Disney store.'
In essence, the rule allowed the Glendale Galleria to decide who
could say negative things about a mall tenant.
Finding that the restriction on speech was content-based,
however, was not dispositive. Content-based restrictions on speech
pass the strict scrutiny test as long as they "employ[] the least
restrictive means to further a compelling interest."11 4 The Galleria
argued that under prior case law, it had a compelling interest in
restricting certain types of speech: the protection of businesses in the
16
mall against disruption. 115 The Ninth Circuit did not agree.
Rather, the court observed that the Glendale Galleria's citations to
prior case law were misplaced.' 17 Those cases had held that
protecting a mall business against disruption met the "substantial
interest" prong of the less restrictive test applied 'to18 content-neutral
rules, but did not qualify as a "compelling interest." "
The Ninth Circuit went on to note that the California Supreme
Court had yet to rule on whether "protection against disruption of
businesses" was a compelling interest.119 Instead of resolving that
issue, the Ninth Circuit used a different yardstick to measure the
Glendale Galleria's rule. 20
The court recognized that both
"California and federal courts have invalidated content-based rules as
unconstitutional when rules contain exceptions, and those exceptions
implicate the same interests that motivates the restriction on the
regulated content.' 12 1 In Glendale Associates I, the mall allowed
naming a tenant when the handbill at issue promoted the tenant's
interests, but prohibited it when the tenant was criticized by the
general public or criticized by a labor union that did not have a
primary dispute with the tenant. 22 The mall's own financial self113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1157.

117. See id.

118. Id.; see also discussion of content-neutral time, place, and manner rules,
supra note 31.
119. Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1156.

120. Id. at 1157-58.
121. Id. at 1157 (citations omitted).
122. Id.
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interest motivated the exception to allow limited commercial speech.
This was the same motive it had when it banned speech that attacked
a mall tenant.
Further, courts have struck down regulations that are "'based on
message
the underlying
hostility--or favoritism-towards
expressed.' 12 3 Here, the Glendale Galleria's rule was motivated by
its own hostility towards handbills criticizing mall tenants, Thus, its
rule forbidding the naming of a124 mall tenant violated the
constitutional rights of the handbillers.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board and found the Glendale
Galleria had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA for threatening to
arrest the Local 57 handbillers because the Galleria did not have a
lawful reason to exclude them. 125 The Galleria's rule forbidding the
mention of a Galleria tenant was a content-based rule that failed to
survive strict scrutiny, and the union's126refusal to follow it provided
no justification for the threat of arrest.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING IN GLENDALE ASSOCIATES1

This comment's analysis of GlendaleAssociates II will focus on
four areas. First, it will argue that the Ninth Circuit's application of
the governmental entity standard in the shopping center context was
correct. Second, it will propose that the Ninth Circuit's decision
could have been based on existing California precedent. It will apply
that precedent to the facts in Glendale Associates II and argue that
the precedent is still good law. Finally, it will examine the
implications of the Ninth Circuit's holding.
A. The Ninth CircuitApplied the ProperStandardin
Glendale Associates II
The Ninth Circuit observed that "privately-owned shopping
centers are required to respect individual free speech rights on their
123. Id. at 1157-58 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386
(1992)).
124. Id. at 1154.
125. Section 8 of the NLRA states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of

the rights guaranteed in section 7 [29 USC § 157] ....
(2000).
126. See Glendale Assocs., 347 F.3d at 1155.

."

29 U.S.C. § 158
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premises to the same extent that government entities are bound to
observe state andfederalfree speech rights."'127 However, the Ninth
Circuit did not justify its decision to apply the governmental entity
standard to shopping centers "to the same extent" as traditional
public forums, although it did trace Pruneyard's analysis and
conclusion that a shopping center is a public forum. 12 Further, the
California Supreme Court's opinion in Pruneyarddid not explicitly
state whether the standard applicable to government entities would
apply within the shopping center context, or whether the test would
be modified. 129 A brief examination of the language used by the
Pruneyard court and prior precedent reveal that the California
Supreme Court intended to apply the standard applicable to
30
governmental entities to the private shopping center context.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied the proper standard in analyzing the
Glendale Galleria's rule.
1. Pruneyardindirectly pointed to the governmental entity standard
The Pruneyardcourt noted that while the public could handbill
131
at shopping centers, the handbillers would not have "free rein."
Shopping centers could adopt "time, place, and manner rules.' 32
"Time, place, and manner" is the same formula that the court has
used to describe the government's ability to regulate the conduct of
33
activities protected by the First Amendment within public forums. 1
Thus, California appellate courts have concluded that Pruneyard
adopted the same standard for shopping centers that is applicable to
government entities. 34 The Ninth Circuit was in good company
when it decided to apply First Amendment standards as well.
127. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). For example, content-based restrictions
by governmental entities must employ the least restrictive means to further a
compelling governmental interest. See id. at 1156.
128. See id. at 1154-55.
129. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910-911
(1979).
130. GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1154-1155.
131. Pruneyard,23 Cal. 3d at 910.
132. Id.
133. Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1562, 1572 (1990).
134. Id.; see also Westside Sane/Freeze v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 224 Cal.
App. 3d 546 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny and holding that a shopping center
rule limiting expressive activity to only petitioning was an unconstitutional
content-based restriction); H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative
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2. Shopping centers may prevent "physical" interference with
business, consistent with prior application of the governmental
entity standard
The Glendale Galleria argued that dissuading the public from
shopping at the Disney Store disrupted its business, and it should be
135
allowed to protect against interference with its business.
However, the Pruneyard court was not setting a new standard
applicable to businesses when it granted businesses the right to
establish "reasonable regulations ... to assure that these [expressive]
' 36
activities do not interfere with normal business operations."'
Rather, the court was adapting the language of the government entity
standards to the shopping center context, without changing the
underlying standard.
Through a slightly circuitous route, the Pruneyardcourt defined
what type of interference with "normal business operations" would
be unacceptable. 137 The Pruneyard court cited to Diamond v.
Bland.13 8 Diamond, in turn, relied upon preceding cases, such as In
re Hoffman.' 39 Hoffman discussed the concept in some depth and
drew heavily from First Amendment jurisprudence applicable to
governmental entities to determine what sort of restrictions could be
placed on handbilling. 140 Subsequent courts have characterized
Hoffman's discussion to mean that expressive activity, in the
shopping mall context, cannot "interfere with the conduct of business
or the use of the property,... impede the movement of customers or
business tenants,... block access to facilities or businesses," nor can
it be noisy, create a14 1 disturbance or "entail the harassment of
uninterested patrons."'
When the Hoffman court forbade expressive activity that
"interfered with the conduct of... business," it was not establishing

Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1208 (1987) (applying "traditional" First
Amendment time, place, and manner analysis to a shopping center's rules).
135. GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1156.
136. Pruneyard,23 Cal. 3d at 911 (emphasis added).

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 903-11.
3 Cal. 3d 653 (1970).
67 Cal. 2d 845, (1967).
Id. at 849-54.

141. H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d
1193, 1208 (1987).
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a new or unique standard applicable to businesses. 142 In its
discussion, the court cited cases that considered the regulation of
expressive activity that physically interfered with government
functions, such as mass demonstrations in the driveway of a city
jail. 143 The Hoffman court did not imply that peaceful persuasion
that turned away customers would qualify as interference with the
conduct of business. 144 A rule would qualify as a time, place, and
manner rule if it addressed activities that physically interfered with
the conduct 45
of business, but not if the rule attempted to forbid lawful
persuasion. 1

By referring to Hoffman's analysis and to "time, place, and
manner restrictions," the Pruneyard court indicated that courts
should apply the governmental entities standard to the shopping
center context.146 Protection against the disruption of business was
not new or unique. Rather, it harkened back to the government's
ability to stop physically disruptive conduct on public property, but
not lawful persuasion. 147 The Ninth Circuit was correct in applying
that standard to Glendale Galleria's content-based restriction.
B. Relevant CaliforniaSupreme Court Precedent Provides an
Alternative Basisfor the Ninth Circuit'sDecision
The Ninth Circuit appropriately concluded that under a First
Amendment analysis, the Glendale Galleria could not enforce a rule
prohibiting the naming of a mall tenant in a non-commercial
handbill. 148 In reaching that decision, the court was obliged to apply
prior decisions of the California Supreme Court in analyzing this
state law issue. 149 The court recognized that the California Supreme
Court had never squarely addressed a shopping center rule
142. Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 852.
143. Id. at 852 (citing a series of cases, including Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39 (1966)).
144. See id. at 851-52.
145. See id. at 853.
146. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 909-11 (1979).
147. See Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 852.
148. Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1155-57 (9th Cir. 2003).
149. Id. at 1154 (citing NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.
1999)). Additionally, to the extent a California Supreme Court case is not
exactly on point, the court's dicta is relevant to the inquiry. Henkin v.
Northrop Corp., 921 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1990).
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promulgated for the "protection against disruption of businesses." 150
However, the court did not apply a prior California Supreme Court
decision that was based on facts similar to those in Glendale
Associates I.
In re Lane' 51 dealt with a retail store that used trespass laws to
prevent union handbillers from distributing handbills calling for a
boycott of the store on the store's private sidewalk.152 While a time,
place, and manner "rule" was not at issue in Lane, the case clearly
articulated that a store cannot protect its business from disruption by
using trespass laws to create a protective shield to prevent labor
union criticism of the store. 153 Since the Ninth Circuit was having to
foray into uncharted territory, Lane bolsters the court's logic, by
providing a rationale approved by the California Supreme Court to
support the Ninth Circuit's disapproval of the Glendale Galleria rule.
The court's hesitancy to cite Lane may have been due, in part, to
some controversy over the continuing validity of Lane.
This Section will demonstrate the relationship between Lane and
Glendale Associates II, advocate that Lane is still good precedent,
and conclude that the Ninth Circuit should have relied on the
rationale in Lane to support its decision in Glendale Associates I.
1. In re Lane provides persuasive support for the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Glendale Associates II
In Lane, the California Supreme Court held that a store could
not use California trespass laws to prevent labor union
representatives from distributing handbills from a privately owned
sidewalk in front of the store's entrance when the handbills asked
customers not to patronize the store.' 54 The union was boycotting
the grocery store because it advertised in newspapers published by

150.
151.
152.
153.

GlendaleAssocs., 347 F.3d at 1156.
71 Cal. 2d 872 (1969).
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 878. Without citing to Lane, the Labor Board used language
similar to that contained in Lane. The Board observed that "[a]s a practical
matter, it appears that the purpose and effect of the rule, as applied here, was
simply to shield the [Glendale Galleria's] tenants, such as the Disney Store,
from being the subject of otherwise lawful handbilling." Glendale Assocs.,
335 N.L.R.B. 27, 28 (2001) (emphasis added).
154. In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d at 873-74.
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the employer with whom the union had a labor
dispute. 155 The
56
union's handbills specifically named the store.
The facts of Lane were very simple. Donald Lane was an
officer of a labor union. 5 7 Armed with handbills targeting Calico
Market, Lane positioned himself on the sidewalk just outside the
doorway of the store. 158 The sidewalk was the market's private
property. 159 The owner threatened him with arrest if he did not
had him arrested.16
leave. 160 When Lane refused to leave, the owner
1 62
laws.
trespass
Lane was convicted of violating
The California Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus,
reversing the trespass conviction. 163 The court reasoned that "[i]f we
were to hold the particular sidewalk area to be 'off limits' for the
exercise of First Amendment rights in effect we would be saying that
by erecting a 'cordon sanitaire' around its store, Calico [Market] has
164
succeeded in immunizing itselffrom on-the-spot public criticism.
The court's decision supported the right of labor union
representatives to distribute handbills on certain types of private
property even when the -handbills "criticized" the entity that
controlled the property.165 It is implicit that in protecting the right to
criticize the store through handbilling, the court was also protecting
the right to name in the handbill the business being criticized.
Although Lane did not involve a store that had adopted
reasonable time, place, and manner rules, it would be inconsistent for
a court to allow a store to adopt a rule that gutted the holding in
Lane. If a store could maintain a rule prohibiting the naming of the
store in any handbills distributed on premises, the store would be
creating the very "cordon sanitaire" that the California Supreme
Court found unconstitutional.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 873-74.
Id.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872, 879.

164. Id. at 876 (emphasis added).

165. Id. at 876-77.

UNIONHANDBILLING

Summer 2004]

1821

The store at issue in Lane was a stand-alone store that leased the
entire store building and had the right of control over the private
walkway in front of the store. 166 While in GlendaleAssociates H1the
rules were maintained by the owner and management of the mall,
rather than the Disney Store, this fact does not alter Lane's
applicability. The Glendale Galleria argued before the Ninth Circuit
that "they have a substantial interest in ensuring that neither their,
nor their tenants', normal business operations are disrupted."' 167 The
Glendale Galleria went on to argue that "if they did not prohibit noncommercial literature that discloses a tenant's name, it would affect
their tenant's investment in Petitioners' property because it would
discourage the public from patronizing the named tenants."' 168 Thus,
the Glendale Galleria was acting on behalf of the Disney Store's
interests by protecting the Disney Store's investment in its location at
the Glendale Galleria. As the rules were maintained for the Disney
Store's benefit, it does not matter that it was the store's agent-the
Glendale Galleria-rather than the Disney Store itself that
maintained the rule. Further, the Glendale Galleria was attempting to
shield the Disney Store-to create a cordon sanitaire free of
criticism-in order to promote its own business interests. Lane is
squarely on point.
2. Lane remains good law in California
a. Californiacourts may rely on prior Californiaprecedent that
granted the publicfree speech rights on privateproperty, even
though the precedent was based on FirstAmendment jurisprudence
The status of Lane as precedent is not without controversy.
Lane was decided before Pruneyard, and was based on a First
Amendment case that was overturned in 1972.169 Additionally, some
California appellate courts have been hesitant to apply Lane outside

166. Id. at 873.

167. Glendale Assocs. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2003).
168. Id.at 1156.

169. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Lane relied on
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968). The Supreme Court in Hudgens stated that Logan Valley
was overruled by the Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972). Hudgens,424 U.S.at 518.
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the labor union context.1 70 However, a review of California Supreme
Court cases demonstrates that Lane continues to hold value as
binding precedent in California.
At the time Lane was decided, the United States Supreme Court
had interpreted the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as protecting "peaceful picketing or handbilling 'carried
on in a location open generally to the public,"'.. such as a typical
suburban shopping center. 171 Based on that Supreme Court
precedent, the California Supreme Court applied a First Amendment
analysis to the facts at issue in Lane. 172 The Lane court found that
the union handbillers had a First Amendment right to distribute their
handbills on the store's private sidewalk. 173 Subsequently, the
United States Supreme Court changed its position and held that the
First Amendment did not provide the public with a free
speech right
174
on the property of privately owned shopping centers.
In spite of its origin under now-overturned First Amendment
jurisprudence, Lane remains good law for analyzing free speech
rights under California's constitution. The Pruneyardcourt looked,
in part, to Lane when it concluded that free speech rights under
California's constitution provided greater protection than the First
Amendment and protected expressive activity conducted on the
private property of shopping centers. 175 The Pruneyard court
recognized that although federal law took a "divergent course," it did
176
not "diminish [Lane's] usefulness as precedent."
The Pruneyard court also affirmed Lane's vitality in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters:177 "Our earlier decisions in Schwartz-Torrance and
Lane-rulings which have not been overruled or eroded in later

cases-established the legality of union picketing on private

170. See cases cited infra note 200.
171. In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d at 874-75 (quoting Amalgamated Food
Employees, 391 U.S. at 313).
172. Id. at 876-77.
173. Id. at 874-78.
174. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); see also Hudgens, 424
U.S. at 518-19.
175. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-10 (1979).
176. Id. at 908.
177. 25 Cal. 3d 317, 326-31 (1979).
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sidewalks outside a store as a matter of state labor law."1 78 However,
at least one court has questioned whether Sears and Lane are still
valid precedent under California law.179 In part, those concerns are
based on the fact that Sears was a plurality decision, and that the
180
concurring justice did not rely upon Lane in joining the plurality.
Through a close look at Justice Newman's concurrence in Sears, and
his decision in Pruneyard,we will see that Lane was ratified by both
Sears and Pruneyard.
b. JusticeNewman 's concurrence did not undermine the Sears
plurality'sposition on Lane
In Sears, the California Supreme Court, by a plurality decision,
held that California's Moscone Act181 prevented courts from issuing
injunctions against peaceful union picketing 182 on private property
outside a retail store.' 83 The court overturned a preliminary
injunction that had granted Sears the right to 84exclude the union
picketers from the sidewalks in front of its store.'
In construing the Moscone Act, the three-justice plurality
opinion found an ambiguity in the reach of subdivision (b) of the
Act. 185 The plurality believed that resolving the ambiguity was
necessary in order to determine whether the Act extended to peaceful
union activity on private property' 6 To resolve the question, the
plurality relied upon language in subdivision (a) of the Act. The
relevant part stated: "the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section
178. Id. at 328.
179. Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
180. Id. 872-73.
181. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979 & Supp. 2004).
182. The court did not indicate whether the signs mentioned the Sears store
by name. However, it is such an accepted practice for picket signs to name the
business against which the picketing is directed, that it was probably not
worthy of note by the court.
183. Sears, 25 Cal. 3d. at 332-33.
184. Id.
185. Section (b)(2) of the Act "appears to declare 'peaceful picketing' to be
legal, and thus not subject to injunction, without regard to the location
of the picketing ...however [(b)(1)] declares picketing 'not involving fraud,
violence or breach of the peace' legal only if it occurs in 'any public street or
any place where any person or persons may lawfully be."' Id. at 324-25. The
plurality set about to resolve this perceived conflict within the statute.
186. Id.
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shall be strictly construed in accordance with existing law governing
labor disputes with the purpose of avoiding any unnecessary judicial
interference in labor disputes."'1 87 From this language the plurality
reasoned that the legislature intended to protect "all union activity
California decisions, has been declared to be
which, under prior
'lawful activity. '188 The opinion then proceeded to recite a series of
relevant prior decisions by the California Supreme Court, including
Lane, concluding that those cases "established the legality of union
picketing on89 private sidewalks outside a store as a matter of state
'
labor law."'
Justice Newman wrote an extremely short concurring opinion.
His entire concurrence stated:
I agree that the injunction order should be reversed, and I
concur in nearly all of Justice Tobriner's reasoning.' 90 He
detects in the Moscone Act, however, certain ambiguities
that to me do not seem to be confounding; and, unlike him,
I do not believe that "the Legislature... intended the courts
to continue to follow [all] principles of California labor law
extant at the time of the enactment of section 527.3." (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 330.)191
Looking at the language Justice Newman used, one can
conclude that the true majority' 92 held that peaceful picketing on
private property outside a retail store was protected from court
injunction under the Moscone Act. Justice Newman concurred "in
nearly all" of the plurality's reasoning. 193 Justice Newman found the
Moscone Act unambiguous and did not need to resort to the prior
extant principles of California labor law. 194 Thus, the plurality's
basic holding-that peaceful picketing on private property outside a
retail store was protected from court injunction under the Moscone
Act-was affirmed by a majority of the justices. However, in
disagreeing with the plurality, Justice Newman modified a sentence

187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979 & Supp. 2004).

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Sears, 25 Cal. 3d at 323 (first emphasis added).
Id. at 328.
Justice Tobriner wrote the plurality opinion. Id. at 320.
Id. at 333 (Newman, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 330).
The plurality plus Justice Newman.
Sears, 25 Cal. 3d at 333 (Newman, J., concurring).
Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
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he quoted from the plurality opinion. He wrote that he did not
believe "the Legislature... intended the courts to continue to follow
[all] principles of California labor law extant at the time of the
enactment of section 527.3." 95 By adding the word "all," it is
apparent that Justice Newman was indicating his reservation that
there may be prior labor law principles that the legislature did not
intend for the courts to follow, leaving it open to a case by case
analysis.
The brevity of Justice Newman's concurrence led one court to
believe that Justice Newman did not approve of Lane as representing
valid California law. 19 6 Since Lane was one of the cases cited by the
plurality to support its analysis of extant principles of California
labor law, Justice Newman's disagreement with the plurality's
position created an ambiguity as to whether Justice Newman also
disagreed with the plurality's approval of Lane.
This ambiguity is easily resolved by turning to the California
Supreme Court's decision in Pruneyard. Justice Newman wrote the
majority opinion in Pruneyard,which approved of Lane as useful
precedent. 197 Justice Newman's prior approval of Lane indicates that
he was not discounting Lane when he expressed his concern in Sears
that the legislature did not intend for the courts to follow all prior
labor law principles. 98 The California Supreme Court clearly
announced that Lane is good precedent.
c. Disagreementover the scope of Lane does not alter its value as
precedent
The California Supreme Court has issued no decision that
undermines Lane. 199 Some California appellate courts, however,
195. Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
196. Waremart Foods v. NLRB, 354 F.3d 870, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
197. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-09.
198. Sears, 25 Cal. 3d at 333 (Newman, J., concurring).

199. The most recent California Supreme Court opinion to mention Lane
was Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th
1013, 29 P.3d 797, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (2001). At issue was whether a free

speech right existed in the interior halls of a private apartment complex. By a
plurality decision, the court held that such a right did not exist. However, both
the concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion (joined by the two other

dissenting justices) cited Lane without questioning its validity or distinguishing
it as a union activity case. Id. at 1038 (George, C.J., concurring); id. at 1052

(Werdegar, J., dissenting). The concurring opinion collectively referred to
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have questioned whether Pruneyard'scitation to Lane altered it from
a First Amendment case to California free speech case.20 0 Of
concern to the courts is whether the private sidewalk of a stand-alone
grocery store-the type of facility at issue in Lane-was a public
forum under Pruneyard.201 The lower courts that have distinguished
Lane have done so on the basis that it is applicable only to union
activity cases
or to cases in which the store itself is the target of the
20 2
dispute.
It is not necessary to resolve that issue in order to conclude that
Lane remains good law for the proposition at issue in Glendale
Associates II. There is no dispute over Lane's holding that when
private property becomes a public forum, the property owner cannot
use California trespass laws to prevent peaceful criticism of the retail
establishment in question. Even if Lane is narrowly read as applying
only to union activity cases, Lane remains directly on point in
Glendale Associates I and II, supporting the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the Glendale Galleria unlawfully used the threat of

Lane and other cases in concluding "the acts of distributing unsolicited
pamphlets, picketing, and soliciting signatures or funds traditionally are
performed in places open to the general public-that is, in places sometimes
referred to as public forums." Id. at 1039 (George, C.J., dissenting).

The

dissenting opinion viewed the case as supporting the "'paramount and
preferred place' that free speech enjoys in the hierarchy of rights in this state."
Id. at 1052 (Werdegarm J., dissenting) (quoting In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872,
878 (1969)). Those citations could be viewed as a four-three split concluding

that the private sidewalk of the grocery store at issue in Lane was a public

forum for purposes of expressive activity.
200. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106, 122-23, 131
Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 734-35 (2003) (third appellate district disagreeing that
Pruneyard altered the First Amendment rationale of Lane, concluding that
when "the expressive activity [is] specifically related to the business use of the
property [it tips] the balance in favor of expressive access"); Costco Cos. v.
Gallant, 96 Cal. App. 4th 740, 755 n.1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355 n.1 (2002)
(fourth appellate district finding no public forum on private property of a
stand-alone store, citing Lane as good law but distinguishing it as applying to
labor union activity only); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73
Cal. App. 4th 425, 434-36, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 449-50 (1999) (first appellate
district refusing to apply Lane to petitioning unrelated to the stand-alone store
at issue; finding no state constitutional free speech rights on private property of
stand-alone stores and distinguishing Lane as based on state labor law).
201. See supra note 200.
202. See id.
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arrest under California trespass laws against union representatives
who targeted a Galleria retail establishment in their handbills.
C. The Implications of Glendale Associates II
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Glendale Associates I will have
an impact at both the state and federal level. Even though it is not
binding on California courts, 203 it is significant for California courts
for two reasons. First, Glendale Associates H1 represented the first
time that a court decided under California state law whether a rule
was lawful that forbade handbillers from identifying a mall tenant by
name. A prior California appellate court decision had noted in dicta
that such a rule might not survive scrutiny, but the issue had not been
preserved on appeal in that case.204 Second, California courts can
look to lower federal courts for persuasive authority.2 °5 The Ninth
Circuit's analysis of Glendale Galleria's unlawful content-based rule
is well articulated and very convincing. The California courts can
adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis when they are confronted with a
same or similar issue.
Glendale Associates II will have the most impact within the
labor relations context at the federal level. This case started out as an
unfair labor practice charge filed with the National Labor Relations
Board.
The Labor Board oversees employee-employer labor
relations and administers the NLRA.
Opinions of the Labor Board set precedent within the context of
employee-employer disputes that are covered by the NLRA.2 °6 The
Labor Board takes the position that administrative law judges who
hear Labor Board cases must follow Labor Board opinions until the
view is reversed by the Labor Board or the United States Supreme
203. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs & Participating Employees Pre-Apprentice,
Apprentice and Journeyman Affirmative Action Training Fund v. Weiss Bros.
Constr. Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 867, 879 n.ll, 270 Cal. Rptr. 786, 793 n.l1
(1990) (noting that California appellate courts are not bound by Ninth Circuit
opinions).
204. Union of Needletrades v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 4th 996, 102021(1997).
205. 9 B.E. WITKIN & WITKIN LEGAL INST., CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE ch.
13, § 942 (1997 & Supp. 2003).

206. See 29 U.S.C. 160 (2000) (empowering the NLRB to prevent unfair
labor practices, take evidence and issue orders); see also Iowa Beef Packers,
144 N.L.R.B. 615 (1963).
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Court.20 7 Federal circuit court decisions that differ from the Labor
Board decisions are not followed by administrative law judges. 208
However, no restriction stops administrative law judges in the future
from considering the analysis of a federal circuit court that supports a
Labor Board holding. 209 Thus, Glendale Associates I will control
how subsequent Labor Board counsel and administrative law judges
approach the issues raised in the case, but the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning provides additional support for the Labor Board's original
decision.
This is good news for labor unions in California. If a labor
union has a dispute with a shopping center tenant-whether it is a
primary or secondary dispute-and the shopping center qualifies as a
public forum, the center cannot forbid handbills that criticize the
tenant by name.
The application of the governmental entity standard to shopping
centers does not mean that malls must tolerate any and all speech.
Rather, California appellate courts have already observed that
"'fighting words,' obscenities, grisly or gruesome displays or highly
inflammatory slogans likely to provoke a disturbance... could be
prohibited. 2 10 Under Glendale Associates I and II, a shopping
center's right to ban that type of speech is not altered.
V. CONCLUSION

As our culture has changed, fewer businesses are directly
fronted by public sidewalks. Retail stores have taken refuge behind
large parking lots or within huge shopping complexes. Thus, the
average citizen spends very little time today walking on public
property. If our free speech rights are to have any meaning for the
individual citizen or small nonprofit groups with limited resources to
spend on mass advertising, expressive activity must follow as the
sidewalk changes from public to private property.
207. See, e.g., Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. at 616 (holding that
the uniform and orderly administration of the NLRA requires that Labor Board
precedent take priority over federal circuit court holdings).
208. See id.
209. See 2 NAT'L LAB. REL. ACT: L. & PRAC. 2d (MB) § 15.08 (Dec. 2003)
(noting that judicial opinions are treated as persuasive authority by
administrative law judges).
210. H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal. App. 3d
1193, 1216 (1987).
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The good news for shopping centers is that those free speech
rights are not without limits. The property owner has the right to
establish reasonable time, place, and manner limits that "are
narrowly drawn and limited to the end of promoting specifically
identified substantial interests., 21
However, content-based
regulations that attempt to shield a particular business from the
sword of expressive activity are not and should not be tolerated by
the courts.
The Ninth Circuit properly decided that the Glendale Galleria
rule was unlawful. The court correctly applied the governmental
entity standard by conducting a First Amendment analysis of the
rule. Using First Amendment jurisprudence, the rule was contentbased and failed the test of strict scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit should have utilized prior California Supreme
Court precedent, In re Lane, to support its decision, as the Ninth
Circuit was dealing with a previously undecided issue under
California law. Lane's holding-that a store could not create a
"cordon sanitaire" to prevent union criticism--cut to the heart of
what transpired in Glendale Associates I. Further, Lane continues to
be valid precedent based on proclamations of the California Supreme
Court in Pruneyardand Sears. Subsequent appellate decisions have
recognized its validity in the labor union context that was at issue in
GlendaleAssociates H.
Glendale Associates I and II have important implications for
labor unions. Labor unions are fighting to win fair pay and working
conditions for the employees the unions represent. One of the more
effective tools that labor unions have in that fight is the ability to call
for a consumer boycott of businesses that are unfair to workers. No
longer can a shopping center in California forbid a union from
handbilling on its property when targeting a center tenant-by
name-with a boycott. In essence, the Ninth Circuit's holding
expands the scope of Lane in the labor union context by preventing
agents or landlords of a store from protecting the store from public
criticism.
And what happened to our Local 57 handbillers in their fight
against the mouse? As in any negotiation, they gained some ground
and they lost some ground. However, ABC/Disney ultimately
211. Id. at 1209.
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relented on its zero percent retirement contribution, and the parties
settled on an employer contribution of three percent of base wages.
Apparently, the message the handbillers sent was heard.
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